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INTRODUCTION

Recently, various states have resorted to the use of drone airstrikes as a
means of targeting terrorist and militant groups. Most notably, the United States
(U.S.) has resorted to using drone airstrikes to target insurgent groups such as AlQaeda, the Taliban, and other armed groups that are disturbing the security and
peace of the international community.1 With regard to the increased usage of
drone airstrikes, this paper investigates its legality and conduct as per
international law.
This article will start off by providing a historical overview of the use of
drone strikes—discussing the early and contemporary use of drone strikes. The
article will then analyze the conditions under which drone strikes are considered
justified and lawful—that is, the jus ad bellum of drone attacks. In this regard,
relevant articles and provisions of the United Nations (UN) Charter will be
outlined, followed by an analysis of the reasons for conducting drone strikes in
*

Advocate Supreme Court of Pakistan.
MICAH ZENKO, REFORMING THE U.S. DRONE STRIKES POLICIES 10 (Council on Foreign Relations,
Council Special Report No. 65, 2013).
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light of international law. This section will focus specifically on the issue of
consent by the host nation. The article will then discuss the jus in bello of drone
attacks, largely placing emphasis on the lawful targeting of drone strikes. The
key elements of this section will include the construction of a distinction between
civilian and military targets, human shields, non-state actors, and internal armed
conflicts. This section will also highlight the discussion with regard to “target
killing versus assassination,” “personality-based targets versus conduct-based
targets,” and “weaponry.”

I. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE USE OF DRONE STRIKES

Drones are aircraft that do not have human pilots on board and are
consequently often referred to as “Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles” (UCAV)
or “Unmanned Aerial Vehicles” (UAV). While they were initially used only for
surveillance, by 2001, the U.S. started to arm these drones with missiles to
combat terrorists in Afghanistan. Ever since then, more than eighty countries,
including the U.S., Russia, Pakistan, India, Iran, China, and Israel, have expanded
the use of UCAV and UAV for combatant and surveillance reasons.2
The U.S. has used UCAV in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, and Iraq. The
U.S. claims that the first drone used for target killing in Afghanistan during
military combat was targeted against Muhammad Atef of Al-Qaeda in November
2001.3 In 2002, a suspected lieutenant of Al-Qaeda was killed—along with five
other people—by drone strikes carried out in Yemen by Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA).4 A UN spokesperson explained this was a “clear case of
extrajudicial killing.”5 Moreover, the U.S. started drone strikes in Pakistan in
2004, and since then, the number of aerial drone strikes has escalated
significantly.6
Some credible sources, such as the head of UCAV control at Nellis Air Force
Base in the U.S. and personnel from the CIA have confirmed that all decisions to
conduct drone strikes are taken at CIA headquarters. These decisions are made at
the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and Nellis Air Force Base after
collective information is gathered from personnel on the ground in New Mexico,
Afghanistan, Pakistan and other places.7
Besides stark criticism over private contractor and CIA involvement in the
decision-making and organizational framework of drone strikes against sovereign
nations, the main contention of the international community is that the copious

2

DRONE WARS: TRANSFORMING CONFLICT, LAW, AND POLICY 4 (Peter L. Bergen & Daniel
Rothenberg eds., 2015).
3
Peter Bergen, A Dangerous New World of Drones, CNN (Oct. 8, 2012, 5:13 AM), http://www.cnn.
com/2012/10/01/opinion/bergen-world-of-drones/.
4
CIA ‘Killed al-Qaeda Suspects’ in Yemen, BBC NEWS (Nov. 5, 2002, 7:16 AM), http://news.bbc.co.
uk/2/hi/2402479.stm.
5
YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 2011 309 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2012).
6
See DRONE WARS, supra note 2, at 13.
7
CRITICAL TERRORISM STUDIES SINCE 11 SEPTEMBER 2001: WHAT HAS BEEN LEARNED? 53 (David
Miller et al. eds., 2014).
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use of drone combat is illegal in the absence of actual or imminent battle or
necessity. Since lethal force is limited to absolute necessity, armed drones can
only be used legally on the battlefield as a military weapon for combat. It is for
this reason that the use of drones must be based on the principles of jus ad
bellum—that is, the laws of conduct and limitation of the use of force in
accordance with international and humanitarian law.8

II. JUS AD BELLUM
A. United Nations Charter Provisions on the Use of Force
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter governs the laws of the use of force by states.
This article outlaws both the use of force and the threat of the use of force in
international relations by stating, “All members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes
of the United Nations.”9
This Article covers all uses of force—including, but not limited to, war10—
and now constitutes a part of customary international law, which must be upheld
by the international community. The only immunity from this embargo on the
use of force is Article 51 of the UN Charter, which preserves states’ innate right
of self-defense through customary international law. Article 51 states:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security
Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in
the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately
reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect
the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the
present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems
necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and
security.11
This Article permits states to engage in armed acts in self-defense, although
this right is also limited so as to prevent misuse of the provision.
Violations of Article 2(4), in the shape of grave armed offenses, have to be
accounted for by the leader of the aggressor state.12 Articles 39 and 42 of the UN
Charter authorize the UN Security Council to use force against aggressors to
8

UGO PAGALLO, THE LAWS OF ROBOTS: CRIMES, CONTRACTS, AND TORTS 57 (2013).
U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
10
Id.
11
U.N. Charter art. 51.
12
Jasmine Moussa, Can Jus ad Bellum Override Jus in Bello?: Reaffirming the Separation of the Two
Bodies of Law, 90 INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 872, 973–74 (2008).
9
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address violations of Article 2(4). Article 39 states, “The Security Council shall
determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be
taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international
peace and security.”13
Article 42 says:
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for
in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be
inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as
may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and
security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade,
and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of
the United Nations.14
It is established, from rulings of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), that
if a state uses force against any other state, then the latter can use force against the
aggressor—relying on the inherent right of self-defense. Such aggression,
however, must involve a substantial use of force and not just be a trivial frontier
incident. In the context of using weapons of mass destruction in response to an
aggression, the ICJ held that the consequent use of force in self-defense must
follow the established doctrines of “necessity” and “proportionality.”15
B. The Use of Drone Strikes and International Law
The U.S. justified its aggression in Afghanistan by using the same principle:
self-defense. The U.S. characterizing the events of 9/11 as an armed attack, while
disregarding the fact that, to this date, the perpetrators of 9/11 stay unidentified
(albeit, known to be non-state actors), and also disregarding the rules of
proportionality and necessity. The strategy with Afghanistan, however, changed
when Hamid Karzai came to power in 2002, replacing the Taliban regime, and
called on the international armed forces already in the country to fight the
insurgent groups.16 Hence, the legal use of force by the U.S. is limited to the
confines of Afghanistan. Since then, the U.S. has used UCAV in the tribal areas
of Pakistan to combat different armed groups and targets, with and without the
consent of the state.17 The U.S., however, has also conducted airborne drone
strikes off the battlefield, where there are no aggressions or skirmishes and where
the consent of the state has not been given.
While it has been suggested that armed groups routinely cross the border
from Afghanistan to Pakistan, this does not mean that the U.S. has the right to use
13

U.N. Charter art. 39.
U.N. Charter art. 42.
15
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. Rep. 226, ¶ 41
(July 8).
16
GLOBAL ANTI-TERRORISM LAW AND POLICY 465 (Victor V. Ramraj et al. eds., 2d ed. 2012).
17
See BRADLEY JAY STRAWSER ET AL., OPPOSING PERSPECTIVES ON THE DRONE DEBATE 168–72
(2014).
14
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force or carry out drone strikes in the regions of Pakistan without the authority of
the state. Likewise, just because a terrorist group plans or carries out terrorist
activity in one state, this does not create the right to use force under a claim of
self-defense in any country where an armed group is acting. Such acts are
sporadic and conducted by non-state actors—states are rarely responsible for
them. Moreover, in the case of Congo v. Uganda, the ICJ concluded that the
inability of Congo to mitigate and control the armed activities of the militants in
Uganda did not establish a right for Uganda to use force in self-defense.18
Therefore, Uganda could not legally violate the sovereignty of Congo and attack
the militants.19
Furthermore, within the territory of a particular state, human rights laws
prohibit the unnecessary use of force to curb insurgent armed groups, unless there
is a substantial use of force by the rebels against the government. The UN
provides standards and basic principles for the use of force by the state on its
citizens and rebels.20 Notwithstanding these clear regulations, the U.S. has
argued that, since the 9/11 attack constitutes a significant use of force, it can
consequently take any measures to combat Al-Qaeda, no matter where it is found.
The Bush regime labeled this justification of using force as the “Global War on
Terror,”21 whereas the Obama regime prefers to call it an “armed conflict with AlQaeda and other associated forces” to justify its use of force by invoking its right
to use force as self-defense.22 The Obama regime is acting to stop expected
future attacks by non-state actors residing in different states by using the theory of
“pre-emptive self-defense,”23 which is not in accordance with the established
values under customary international law.
The International Law Association defines armed conflict by setting basic
criteria for the use of force, under which an armed conflict must include the
presence of an organized group, inter alia, intensely fighting with other groups.24
It is pertinent to note that isolated attacks by the armed groups acting as terrorists
do not constitute an armed conflict and, hence, do not contravene the
aforementioned criteria.
Furthermore, the U.S. has tried to justify its drone attacks by the principle of
“hot pursuit,” but this principle is only recognized in the law of the seas, and not
on land.25

18
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda),
Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. Rep. 168, 170 (Dec. 2005).
19
Id.
20
U.N. Charter art. 51.
21
Peter L. Bergen & Jennifer Rowland, World of Drones: The Global Proliferation of Drone
Technology, in DRONE WARS, supra note 2, at 300, 300.
22
Leanne Pigot, The “Bush Doctrine” and the Use of Force in International Law, in THE IMPACT OF
9/11 AND THE NEW LEGAL LANDSCAPE: THE DAY THAT CHANGED EVERYTHING? 241, 246 (Matthew J.
Morgan ed., 2009).
23
WILLIAM F. GROVER & JOSEPH G. PESCHEK, THE UNSUSTAINABLE PRESIDENCY: CLINTON, BUSH,
OBAMA, & BEYOND 88 (2014).
24
KOSOVO: A PRECEDENT?: THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, THE ADVISORY OPINION, AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR STATEHOOD, SELF-DETERMINATION AND MINORITY RIGHTS 242 (James Summers ed.,
2011).
25
Convention on the High Seas art. 23, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 11.
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C. The Consent of the Host Nation
The matter of consent is extremely important in assessing the legality of the
use of drone strikes for two reasons. First, a country cannot resort to the use of
force without the existence of an actual armed conflict, even in its own territory.
Second, even if there is an actual armed conflict, the practices of drone attacks
must follow the principles of proportionality and necessity. Counterterrorism
expert David Kilcullen believes that drones are not able to pursue military goals
because the legal requirement for proportionality has to be followed.26 Drone
strikes assassinate far more people in collateral damage than the actual target;
although the actual target is usually only one person, the number of casualties is
around ten people per attack.27
There are a number of concerns with regard to airborne drones acting without
the consent of the targeted states. Arguably, operating UCAV in a state’s
territory not only violates U.S. policy, but also violates the sovereignty of the host
state. The U.S. contends, however, that the records demonstrate consent being
given by the host states. For example, the Obama administration has claimed that
the U.S. conducted airstrikes with the “full consent and cooperation” of the host
states.28 In this context, David Sanger has written in his book, Confront and
Conceal, that the prime minister of Pakistan, Yusaf Raza Gillani, told the U.S.
ambassador, Anne Patterson, in 2008 that “I do not care if you conduct the drone
attacks, as long as you get the right people.”29 The U.S. claims that for a very
long period of time Pakistan has permitted U.S. officials to launch UCAV in
Pakistani airbases, aided U.S. military and intelligence in locating targets in the
Federal Administrative Tribal Areas (FATA), and authorized the CIA and U.S.
military to conduct drone strikes in the designated kill boxes. It is further claimed
that Pakistan and the U.S. had a joint UCAV program in 2006, in which Pakistani
administrators were operating drones, deciding routes, identifying targets, and
using firepower. In this regard, in 2012 the New York Times identified the names
of the people who were hired by Pakistani military intelligence and had helped
the U.S. in UCAV attacks.30 These officials contradicted the official Pakistani
stance of opposing the drone strikes.31 Furthermore, opinions regarding the
Pakistani consent in U.S. drone attacks are in other reports, claiming that the U.S.
did not acquire the official consent of Pakistan; the U.S. has theoretically
acquired the “tacit consent” of Pakistan, since Pakistan has not strongly opposed
the drone attacks and effectively permitted the drone attacks.32 Such claims of

26
See David Akerson, Applying Jus in Bello Proportionality to Drone Warfare, 16 OR. REV. INT’L L.
173, 179 (2014) (discussing the low “hit rate” for drone attacks by the United States).
27
NETA CRAWFORD, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR KILLING: MORAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR COLLATERAL
DAMAGE IN AMERICA’S POST-9/11 WARS 209 (2013).
28
Byron Tau, Brennan: Drones ‘Necessary’, POLITICO (Apr. 30, 2012), http://www.politico.com/
story/2012/04/brennan-drones-necessary-not-vengeance-075751.
29
DAVID E. SANGER, CONFRONT AND CONCEAL: OBAMA’S SECRET WARS AND SURPRISING USE OF
AMERICAN POWER (2012).
30
Declan Walsh, Drone War Spurs Militants to Deadly Reprisals, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 29, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/30/world/asia/drone-war-in-pakistan-spurs-militants-to-deadlyreprisals.html.
31
Id.
32
CONFLICT AND PEACE IN EURASIA 170 (Debidatta Mahapatra ed., 2013).
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consent are debatable given that the official Pakistani stance has opposed such
claims. One commentator stated that:
About once a month the Central Intelligence Agency sends a fax
to a general at Pakistan’s Intelligence service outlining broad
areas where the U.S intends to conduct strikes with drone
aircraft, accordingly to U.S officials. The Pakistanis, who in
public oppose the program, don’t respond.
On this basis, plus the fact that Pakistan continues to clear airspace in the
targeted areas, the U.S government concludes it has tacit consent to conduct
strikes within the borders of a sovereign nation . . . .33
Harold Koh, the legal consultant to the U.S. State Department, noted that the
aforementioned Pakistani practice of tacit consent established substantial
permission, and he added that drone strikes in the absence of valid permission
establish an act of war against a sovereign state.34 This issue of Pakistani consent
in regard to drone attacks has been discussed attentively. The Bureau of
Investigative Journalism investigated and found that Pakistan had not given
consent for drone strikes in its territory and denied the establishment of tacit
consent.35 Finally, in 2012, the Pakistani parliament unanimously agreed: clearly
and officially commanding the instant termination of U.S. drone attacks in the
territories of Pakistan.36 Pakistan continues to press these same demands,37 but
the U.S. has disregarded such demands. A U.N. official established that drones
attacks by the U.S. breach Pakistani sovereignty.38

II. JUS IN BELLO

The U.S. is involved in two types of armed conflicts while conducting drone
strikes. The first is the transnational non-international conflict, in which the U.S.
maintains that the scope of such conflict has no territorial confinement. The
second type of conflict is the customary non-international conflict, in which the
U.S. acts to help an ally within the geographical boundaries of the ally state. The
first kind of conflict has been contested in international law for its legality, but it
has been authorized by the Obama administration and supported by the U.S.
Supreme Court in the case of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.39 John Brennan added that
33
Adam Entous et al., U.S. Unease over Drone Strikes, WALL STREET J. (Sept. 26, 2012, 6:59 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390444100404577641520858011452.
34
Id.
35
Chris Woods, Pakistan ‘Categorically Rejects’ Claim That It Tacitly Allows U.S. Drone Strikes,
THE BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM (Sept. 28, 2012), https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/
stories/2012-09-28/pakistan-categorically-rejects-claim-that-it-tacitly-allows-us-drone-strikes.
36
At U.N., Pakistan Presses On It’s [sic] Demand for End to Illegal Drone Strikes, THE NEWS (July
2, 2016), https://www.thenews.com.pk/latest/132367-Pakistan-presses-demand-end-illegal-drone-strikes.
37
Id.
38
U.N. Official Says U.S. Drones Breach Pakistan Sovereignty, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/16/world/asia/un-official-denounces-us-drone-use-in-pakistan.html.
39
548 U.S. 557 (2006).
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the U.S. does not feel restricted to only use of force in “hot” battlefield areas like
Afghanistan, but he acknowledged that some of the allies of the U.S. do not share
the same opinion and prefer to restrict themselves to hot battlefields.40
Interestingly, while the U.S. conducts airstrikes in non-international conflicts
to terminate targets on the kill list, the authority to act does not come from its
statutes, such as the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), but, rather,
the U.S. justifies such terminations by claiming that the subject presents a peril to
a U.S. ally and it is in foreign policy interests of the U.S. Through this maneuver,
the U.S. can convert simple non-state actors’ actions—from acts of vandalism to
non-transnational conflicts—to international conflict by exacerbating trivial
matters. For example, when insurgents were posing a threat to the Yemeni
government, U.S. drone airstrikes were carried out to stabilize the Yemen regime
against insurgency.41 This effectively transformed the conflict from one between
Yemen and the insurgents to one between Yemen and the U.S. versus the
insurgents, or the U.S. versus Al-Qaeda.
Therefore, these two kinds of conflicts with Al-Qaeda give the U.S.
administration ample authority to create kill lists and conduct target killings. In
this manner, the U.S. justifies its drone attacks in two ways: first, by arguing that
the concept of transnational non-international conflict with Al-Qaeda is not
confined to geographical locations and limits of the boundaries; and, second, by
theorizing that a non-international, insurgency conflict within the borders of an
ally state requires U.S. intervention to stabilize the situation. Paradoxically,
however, the U.S. has been using firepower against the government of Syria
while also arming insurgent groups. Consequently, this strategy is destabilizing
the region and establishing a risk to the peace and security of the global
community—simply for the purpose of removing the Assad regime.42 On the
other hand, in accordance with the norms of international laws, arming insurgents
against a state is an act of war and is a clearly abominable act against humanity.
In the case of Nicaragua v. USA, the ICJ arrived at the conclusion that the U.S.
violated international law by providing material support to Nicaraguan rebels.43
A. Lawful Killing
In accordance with the justifications given above, targets on kill lists can be
categorized into the following three groups:
a.) Targets falling into the AUMF considerations.
b.) Targets falling into the terms and conditions of the secret action findings.
c.) Targets falling into the list of insurgent groups posing threat to a U.S. ally
state, where the U.S. is a participant.

40

GEOFFREY CORN ET AL., THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE LAWS OF WAR 91 (2d ed. 2015).
Chris Downes, Targeted Killing in the Age Of Terror: The Legality of the Yemen Strike, 9 J.
CONFLICT & SEC. L. 277, 280–81 (2004).
42
See ARNOLD SCHUCHTER, ISIS CONTAINMENT AND DEFEAT at ch. 1 (2015).
43
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986
I.C.J. Rep 14 (June 27).
41
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B. Lawful Targeting
For a combatant to be legally targeted, he needs to be defined in accordance
with customary humanitarian law, which is concerned with the treatment of a
combatant in armed conflict. Humanitarian law defines a combatant as a
participant in conflicts, who, when captured, is then called a prisoner of war.44
Combatants are further defined as state actors—to be distinguished from nonstate actors—who represent state conduct, including members of forces and
volunteers—to be distinguished from civilians, who do not take part in conflict.45
To undertake targeting, humanitarian law encompasses four major rules:
“humanity,” “military necessity,” “distinction,” and “proportionality.”46 The law
of war prescribes strict limits on the conduct of states in an armed conflict,
primarily, to limit the negative effects of the war and reduce the suffering of those
affected by the war. As Grotius remarked, “it is not for a man to put his fellow
man to a wasteful use.”47 Therefore, distinction is an important factor to be
considered both in terms of who is targeted and the means of targeting.48
Additionally, distinction is required to follow the principle of military
necessity, as international humanitarian law does not even allow the killing of
armed personnel forces if it is not absolutely necessary. Accordingly, if there is
no necessity to use military force, international humanitarian law does not permit
retribution, even against combatants who have participated or continue to
participate in hostilities. Distinction must be applied when targeting combatants,
and notions of humanity must also be considered while facing an adversary by
providing them with the opportunity to surrender to avoid preventable massacres.
The ICJ reiterated these contentions by stating: “methods and means of warfare,
which would preclude any distinction between civilian and military targets, or
which would result in unnecessary suffering to combatants, are prohibited.”49
C. Distinction Between Civil and Military Targets
The legality of targeting individuals depends on the status of the target.
Therefore, distinguishing civilians from military targets is required for lawful
targeting. The protection granted to civilians and those not participating in armed
conflicts has long been established. Those not participating in hostilities are
given the privilege of protection from being targeted in any conflict; this includes
a variety of people even when they belong to the opposing camp. Likewise,
targeting civilians in international or non-international hostilities is now a war
crime. Therefore, the first distinction for determining a lawful target is that the
target must actively participate in hostilities. This includes carrying out attacks,
laying mines, and so on, but does not include those who take a supportive role—
44
Int’l Committee of the Red Cross, Customary IHL Rule 3: Definition of Combatants (2017),
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule3 [hereinafter IHL Rule 3].
45
See id.
46
U.S. ARMY, LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT DESKBOOK (David Lee ed., 5th ed. 2015), http://www.loc.
gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/LOAC-Deskbook-2015.pdf.
47
LARRY MAY, AGGRESSION AND CRIMES AGAINST PEACE 121 (2008).
48
Id.
49
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226 (July 8).
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for example, supplying food or clothes.50 Accordingly, the principle of
distinction grants immunity to civilians from being targeted, but, at the same time,
it criminalizes adopting a civilian disguise for deception.51 Using civilian
disguises comes within the definition of “perfidy,”52 a war crime under customary
international law.53 To be sure, the past conduct of a person or a previous
association with an armed group does not make him a lawful target. A person
who was previously a combatant but is no longer associated with the military or
militant organization will be considered a civilian.54 Civilians, however, may be
harmed “incidentally or unintentionally” when military objectives are targeted,
subject to proportionality. Here, “incidentally or unintentionally” implies that the
use of force—and any collateral damage—should not be disproportionate, and,
instead, it should be avoided if there are alternate means or methods available.55
D. Human Shields
A human shield can be defined as a civilian deliberately installed by militants
in close proximity to themselves to avoid targeting or to protect militant goals.
Such shields violate humanitarian law.56 Civilians, however, are generally
protected under humanitarian law in general, which includes the specific
instances when civilians are in close proximity to combatants—whether
accidently or as a result of combatants deliberately hiding among them.57 Indeed,
the legality of targeting civilians is only debatable in situations where the
civilians voluntarily chose to be human shields or work in war industries. In
times of conflict, there will always be collateral damage. Therefore, proportional
collateral damage to civilians is permitted and lawful to the extent that it is the
last resort to reconcile armed conflict and it is not disproportionate to the
corresponding military advantage gained.58 As Grotius pointed out, “Though
there may be circumstances, in which absolute justice will not condemn the
50
Int’l Committee of the Red Cross, Direct Participation in Hostilities: Questions & Answers (Feb. 6,
2009), https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/faq/direct-participation-ihl-faq-020609.htm.
51
1 JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW: RULES 3–5 (2005).
52
“Perfidy” is defined as “acts inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead him to believe that he is
entitled to, or obliged to accord, protection under the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict,
with intent to betray that confidence” and can include a combatant disguising as a civilian or any other
person hors de combat to trick the opponent. Id. at 223–24 (quoting Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts,
art. 37(1), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3).
53
Id. at 214–15. Explaining that this practice corrodes the basic principles of international
humanitarian law by violating the principle of distinction and removing the trust that is established
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sacrifice of lives in war, yet humanity will require that the greatest precaution
should be used against involving the innocent in danger, except in cases of
extreme urgency and utility.”59
E. Non-State Actors and Internal Armed Conflicts
The rule of distinction is also applicable to non-state actors and internal
armed conflicts, although countries treat non-state combatants as terrorists subject
to domestic laws. To begin, it must be understood that members of structured
militant groups are functional insurgent combatants working against the state, and
targeting them within their state and their ally states—with consent—is lawful.60
In those instances where individuals belong to a structured and controlled armed
group with terrorist agendas, targeting them is permissible.61 Likewise,
regardless of the law the state intends to apply to an internal armed conflict,
certain personnel who participate in hostilities against the state can be
characterized as combatants under the principle of distinction.62 Conversely, to
protect noncombatants during internal armed conflict, humanitarian law, through
Article 3 of the Geneva Convention, offers certain safeties to noncombatants
during non-international armed conflict.63
With regard to attacks on the U.S. military in Afghanistan, targeting the
Taliban leaders and their guards would be considered necessary and within the
limits of distinction. At the same time, an issue arises with regard to the use of
distinctive signs or uniforms, as required by customary humanitarian law, in the
context of U.S. military operations against the Taliban. The purpose of this
requirement is not to distinguish militants from each other but to differentiate
them from the general population. Moreover, any individual from a non-state
actor militant organization who admits to supporting anti-international law
agendas is no longer a civilian—at least until he ceases active participation in the
militant objectives of such groups.
Moreover, any use of force during armed conflict must conform with the
limits provided by customary international law. Therefore, the choice of targets
of a defensive action requires a necessity criterion. In this regard, the ICJ has also
maintained that the use of force must follow the principle of necessity, in
congruence with humanitarian laws.64 This implies that the mere identification or
characterization of individuals as combatants does not constitute the lawful use of
target killing. Since, by definition, to conduct a killing, it must be an actual
military necessity—taking into consideration the principles of necessity and
proportionality within the confines of actual armed conflict and self-defense
59
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under humanitarian laws.
Therefore, identifying individuals as probable
combatants and conducting drone attacks without actual armed conflict within the
sovereign borders of another state, without consent of that state, constitutes an act
of war.65
F. Target Killing Versus Assassination
The notion of “target killing” has been defined as the use of lethal force with
the deliberate intention of killing non-imprisoned personnel subjected to
international law.66 A target killing is similar to an assassination or an
extrajudicial killing, both of which are prohibited by international law.67 The use
of state agents to assassinate targeted individuals violates the legal requirements
of due process. To some degree, assassination is also target killing, though with
the added characteristics of being committed during peacetime, politically
motivated, and illegal. During peacetime, the applicable international law is
human rights law, which mandates the requirements of due process before the use
of any lethal force except as a law enforcement measure.68 It is for such reasons
that target killing cannot be justified during peacetime.69
The concept of assassination—defined as the treacherous killing of a selected
individual of the opposing camp70—is also present in armed conflict. This is
distinct from “perfidy”: in the context of armed conflict, target killing must still
follow the principles of distinction as enunciated above.71 The principles of jus in
bello—necessity, proportionality, and precaution—must still be satisfied when
targeting individuals. Furthermore, target killing operations are still subject to
certain prohibitions under the principles regarding the conduct of wars or
hostilities—such as the prohibitions against the denial of quarters, perfidy, and
the use of certain weapons.72
G. Personality-Based Targets Versus Conduct-Based Targets
A distinction should also be drawn between personality-based targets and
conduct-based targets.73 The personality-based targets are those holding positions
of authority in an organization.74 Conduct-based targets—which are primarily
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associated with non-state actors—on the other hand, are those who have been
involved in specific operations or violent, terrorist acts.75
Accordingly, the U.S. has defended the targeted killing of some individuals
on the ground that they are personality-based targets. The U.S. has also argued
that these targets are associates of terrorist organizations operating within the
territories of another country, such that the targeted killing is justifiable law
enforcement—disregarding humanitarian law.
The U.S. has therefore used its legal frameworks to target individuals who
are either associates of terrorist organizations or have been involved in terror
plots. In either case, the legality of target killing depends on international human
rights law, which protects the right to life of individuals against the unlawful
targeting of civilians outside actual armed conflicts.76 Even within the confines
of law enforcement standards, target killing must maintain the preventive,
compulsive characteristics and serve as a last resort in an armed conflict. In
addition, the due process requirement of the law must be afforded to every
individual regardless of his position in the organization or involvement in any
incident.77
It is further contended that target killings justified on “personality” or
“conduct” bases to preemptively prevent future crimes are still subject to the rule
of necessity and must be grounded in the immediacy of conflict.78 However, it
can be argued that such target killings have no legal basis as the crime has not yet
been committed, and the probability to measure the same is questionable. This
means that such practices of target killing come within the ambit of extrajudicial
killing prohibited under the jus cogens principles. It is generally understood that
criminals, whether national or international, must be dealt with through law
enforcement methods. The reality is that humanitarian law does not deal with
targeted killings in the absence of armed conflict. Instead, such targeted killings
must be dealt with through law enforcement methods as defined by human rights
law. Human rights law puts an absolute prohibition on target killings while also
imposing necessary restraints to forestall any arbitrary deprivation of life.79
H. Weaponry
Reverting to the topic of armed conflict, there are also issues related to the
use of certain weaponry. Modern warfare has seen the use of weaponry that is
incapable of distinguishing combatant from noncombatant targets, and, as a
result, they can cause mass suffering. Customary international law forbids use of
75
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such weaponry.80 In any conflict, the value of the target is calculated against the
force necessary to weaken the opponent or end the conflict. Moreover, such
calculation gives due consideration to alternate methods and means in every
military operation. As a result, the analysis of alternate methods when directing
an attack necessarily requires a prompt decision regarding other actions and
weaponry available. Therefore, in an armed conflict, due consideration must be
given to the means of targeting, while precaution must be taken to reduce
collateral damage and casualties.81
One concerning example with respect to distinction and modern weaponry is
the U.S. claim to use of drones in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Yemen for targeted
killings. It is hugely controversial whether drones are inherently discriminatory
weapons or if their use is in accordance with the principles of jus ad bellum or jus
in bello. Arguably, a number of factors make drones indiscriminate weapons.
For instance, drone operators rely on data, which may not be accurate.
Additionally, the computers used to control drones are partly autonomous—the
drone operators rely strongly on analyses from computers for accuracy.
Furthermore, the operators are removed from the reality and circumstances of the
field—the operating decisions are made in light of some technical data relayed on
screens to them, similar to video games.82
Moreover, CIA operatives—who are neither members of the military forces
nor trained in legal understandings of distinction, proportionality, or necessity in
armed conflicts—are operating these drones. Drones are not law enforcement
weapons but military weapons, and therefore, their use must be governed by jus
ad bellum and jus in bello. The use of drones in any case must be solely by
military personnel, as CIA operatives would be recognized as combatants—and
unlawful combatants, at that—and cannot take part in armed conflicts—which in
most cases do not even exist—under humanitarian law.83
The targeted killing by the use of drones must therefore be analyzed within
the established norms and regulations of proportionality, necessity, and
distinction. If the targets are noncombatants then they are not lawful targets
according to the principles of distinction. It is contended that drone strikes by the
U.S. in Pakistan are illegal, as drone attacks without official consent breach the
sovereignty of Pakistan, and, furthermore, these attacks do not follow the rules of
humanitarian law because they are disproportionate and unnecessary killings
outside the theater of actual armed conflict. For instance, most individuals
collaterally killed by drone attacks were identified as noncombatant civilians—
neither participating in any terrorist activities nor having any connections with
such groups.84 Similarly, the majority of U.S. drone attacks were conducted in
noncombatant zones, where civilian casualties were almost certain. Even, for the
sake of argument, if there had been any terrorists killed in drone strikes, the
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number of civilians killed and the use of firepower would violate humanitarian
laws for being highly disproportionate. As emphasized earlier, collateral damage
must be kept within certain bounds, with particular reference to the criteria of
unintended collateral damage and precautions to prevent the loss of innocent
lives.85 Therefore, the use of drones seems to have ignored the principles of
distinction, necessity, and proportionality, and has also overlooked the
requirements for an actual conflict and the consent of host state. Thus it falls
short of meeting the standards of international and humanitarian laws.86

CONCLUSION

In order to understand the legality of the use of drone strikes, it is relevant to
note that Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits the use of force and that Article
51 is the only exemption against such a use of force under the jus cogens
principles of self-defense under customary international law. Drone strikes, and
thereby target killing, constitutes an act of war and the use of force can only be
justified as self-defense in an actual armed conflict. Attacking non-state actors in
hot pursuit in the host states is against customary international law according to
the ICJ. Drones, however, can be used against insurgent groups or terrorist
organizations by a foreign state with the consent of host state, but, even then, only
to stabilize the region. Hence, drone attacks against the will of a host state or
drone attacks against a state to help rebel groups destabilize a region are entirely
illegitimate.
Furthermore, even if the drone strikes are legal, do not constitute an act of
war against any state, and are conducted with the consent of host states, they must
follow certain humanitarian law principles. Such principles present vigorous
restraints over such use of force. First, drone strikes must be undertaken out of
absolute military necessity—that is, where recourse to drone attacks or the use of
force must be the last available resort to reconcile an armed conflict. Second, to
commence a kill list in drone attacks, targets must be combatants—distinguished
from the noncombatant civilian population in accordance with the principle of
distinction under humanitarian law—to avoid lawlessness and complete injustice.
Third, drone attacks must be aligned with the principle of proportionality, by
which civilians are protected against collateral damage.
So, arguably, because Pakistan has taken an official stance that demands the
immediate cessation of drone attacks inside its territory, drone attacks by the U.S.
in Pakistan are an unlawful use of force since there is no actual armed conflict
and there is no consent of the host state. Furthermore, these drone attacks are an
act of war against Pakistan’s sovereignty. Perhaps, arguably, even if Pakistan
gives its consent—covertly or unofficially—to the US to conduct drone attacks,
the rules of proportionality, necessity, and distinction still make these drone
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attacks unlawful. Indeed, if there is any collateral damage to the civilian
population—in the absence of actual armed conflict and with available
alternatives to reconcile the armed conflict—it would infringe humanitarian laws.
Nevertheless, the U.S. maintains that it has obtained Pakistan’s tacit consent
to conduct drone attacks against terrorists because Pakistani officials covertly
allow such drone attacks. The U.S. further asserts that such drone attacks follow
a “personality-based test,” where members of terrorist organizations are targeted
and not assassinated. So, to avoid despicable future terrorist activities in the
region and in foreign lands by non-state actors, the U.S. argues that drone attacks
within the territories of host states in the form of preemptive measures are
needed, and that civilian collateral damage is a cost in accordance with customary
international law.

